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Abstract
People often make more rational choices between monetary prospects when their choices will be played out many times
rather than just once. For example, previous research has shown that the certainty effect and the possibility effect (two
common-ratio effects that violate expected utility theory) are eliminated in multiple-play decisions. This finding is challenged
by seven new studies (N = 2391) and two small meta-analyses. Results indicate that, on average, certainty and possibility
effects are reduced but not eliminated in multiple-play decisions. Moreover, in our within-participants studies, the certainty
and possibility choice patterns almost always remained the modal or majority patterns. Our primary results were not reliably
affected by prompts that encouraged a long-run perspective, by participants’ insight into long-run payoffs, or by participants’
numeracy. The persistence of common-ratio effects suggests that the oft-cited benefits of multiple plays for the rationality of
decision makers’ choices may be smaller than previously realized.
Keywords: common-ratio effect, reverse common-ratio effect, certainty effect, possibility effect, multiple play, repeated play.
1 Introduction
In many instances, people make better, more rational deci-
sions when they take a broad view of their situation rather
than a narrow view (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Read,
Loewenstein & Rabin, 1999). For example, buying an ex-
tended warranty for a particular electronic device may seem
appealing when one is thinking only about that device, but
thinking more broadly may make it easier to realize that the
aggregate cost of such warranties over many appliances and
devices almost certainly exceeds the expected cost of possi-
ble failures. Assuming that such insurance is a moneymaker
for the seller, insuring against relatively small losses that
one can afford doesn’t make much sense, at least in terms
of expected value (EV). Although this argument can be —
and perhaps should be — applied to an individual purchase,
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many people find the notion of an expectation to be more
compelling when they consider aggregating over numerous
purchases.
Indeed, an ever-growing body of research has indicated
that people are more likely to make decisions that are in ac-
cord with EV theory or expected utility (EU) theory when
they consider risky options whose outcomes will be aggre-
gated over many plays (for a review, see Wedell, 2011). For
example, people are more likely to accept mixed gambles
(those involving the possibility of a gain or a loss) with posi-
tive EVs when they will be played multiple times rather than
just once (Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; DeKay & Kim, 2005;
Klos, 2013; Klos, Weber & Weber, 2005; Langer & Weber,
2001; Montgomery & Adelbratt, 1982; Redelmeier & Tver-
sky, 1992; Wedell & Böckenholt, 1994). Similarly, for gam-
bles involving either gains or losses (but not both), people
are more likely to choose the higher-EV option in multiple
play than in single play (Camilleri & Newell, 2013; Hais-
ley, Mostafa & Loewenstein, 2008; Joag, Mowen & Gentry,
1990; Li, 2003; Su et al., 2013; but see Chen & Corter, 2006,
for conflicting results). For gains, Wulff, Hills, and Hertwig
(2015) recently extended this result to the situation in which
participants learn about the probabilities and outcomes of
the gambles via sampling (i.e., decisions from experience
rather than decisions from description; for reviews, see Her-
twig, 2015; Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Additional studies have
indicated that preference reversals (Wedell & Böckenholt,
1990), ambiguity aversion (Liu & Colman, 2009), and the
description-experience gap (Camilleri & Newell, 2013) are
also reduced in multiple play. Although most of these stud-
ies have involved monetary gambles, the results appear to
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extend to other situations as well (DeKay & Kim, 2005; Liu
& Colman, 2009; Joag et al., 1990), at least when partic-
ipants consider the aggregation of outcomes over multiple
plays to be reasonable (DeKay & Kim, 2005; for related re-
sults, see DeKay, 2011; DeKay, Hershey, Spranca, Ubel &
Asch, 2006).1
1.1 Common-ratio effects
Previous research has also indicated that common-ratio ef-
fects are eliminated in multiple-play decisions (Barron &
Erev, 2003, Study 5; Keren, 1991; Keren & Wagenaar,
1987). These effects, and their moderation in multiple play,
are the focus of this article. Demonstrations of common-
ratio effects require two choice problems: a scaled-up prob-
lem and a scaled-down problem. The possible outcomes
in the two problems are identical, but the probabilities of
the nonzero outcomes in the scaled-down problem are de-
creased by the same factor relative to corresponding proba-
bilities in the scaled-up problem. For example, in one ver-
sion that we use, the scaled-up problem is a choice between
Option A (a 100% chance of $60) and Option B (an 80%
chance of $100, otherwise $0; hereafter, we omit the $0
outcome). In the scaled-down problem, the probabilities of
winning in both options are divided by four (the common ra-
tio) to yield a choice between A′ (a 25% chance of $60) and
B′ (a 20% chance of $100). The percentage of participants
choosing the higher-EV option (B or B′, depending on the
problem) is typically much higher in the scaled-down prob-
lem than in the scaled-up problem; this discrepancy is the
common-ratio effect. In this particular example, the discrep-
ancy is also called a certainty effect (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Keren &Wagenaar, 1987), because one of the options
in the scaled-up problem is a sure thing.
1We follow Camilleri and Newell (2013; and also Chen & Corter,
2006) in distinguishing betweenmultiple-play and repeated-play situations,
though we recognize that these terms have been used interchangeably in the
past. In Camilleri and Newell’s usage, a typical, binary multiple-play sit-
uation involves a single decision about a gamble (or a choice between two
gambles) that will be played many times, with the same choice applying
to all plays. A repeated-play situation, on the other hand, involves a string
of identical single-play decisions in which the decision maker can make a
different choice for each play. Although these two situations are clearly re-
lated, they are empirically different (Camilleri & Newell, 2013), in part be-
cause people do not naturally aggregate possible outcomes over a series of
plays (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992; Thaler, Tver-
sky, Kahneman & Schwartz, 1997). Multiple-play and repeated-play deci-
sions are normatively different as well, because the latter variety involves
the option of changing one’s choice partway through the sequence. Aloy-
sius (2007) noted that past disagreements regarding rationality in Samuel-
son’s (1963) famous example (which involved a person declining one play
but accepting 100 plays of a 50:50 gamble for $200 or –$100) can be at-
tributed in part to Samuelson’s treating a multiple-play situation as if it
were a repeated-play situation. Chen and Corter also noted this discrep-
ancy. In the present article, we are primarily concerned with (a) descriptive
rather than normative issues and (b) multiple-play rather than repeated-play
decisions.
A common-ratio effect that involves very low probabili-
ties in the scaled-down problem is called a possibility effect
(Keren & Wagenaar, 1987). In our version, the scaled-up
problem is a choice between C (a 90% chance of $50) and
D (a 45% chance of $120) and the scaled-down problem is
a choice between C′ (a 2% chance of $50) and D′ (a 1%
chance of $120), where the chances of winning have been
divided by 45. As before, the higher-EV option (D or D′) is
typically much more popular in the scaled-down problem.
The modal choice pattern in these problems (e.g., choos-
ing C in the scaled-up version and D′ in the scaled-down
version of the possibility-effect example) violates EU the-
ory. Under EU theory, choosing C over D implies that .90×
u($50) > .45 × u($120), which simplifies to u($50)/u($120)
> 0.5. Similarly, choosing D′ over C′ implies that .02 ×
u($50) < .01 × u($120), which simplifies to u($50)/u($120)
< 0.5. These conclusions are contradictory; there is no
utility function consistent with both preferences. By the
same logic, the opposite patterns (choosing B and A′ in the
certainty-effect example or D and C′ in the possibility-effect
example) also violate EU theory. These reverse patterns are
less well known, but are common for some sets of problems
(e.g., when the probabilities in the scaled-up and scaled-
down problems differ by a smaller factor; Blavatskyy, 2010;
Nebaut & Dubois, 2014).2
When discussing these issues, we find it useful to dis-
tinguish between an effect and a choice pattern. For the
problems considered in this article, we define the common-
ratio effect (and the two special cases, the certainty effect
and the possibility effect) as the empirical observation that
participants are more likely to choose the riskier, higher-EV
option in the scaled-down problem than in the correspond-
ing scaled-up problem. This definition applies equally to
between-participants and within-participants designs and is
independent of theoretical explanations (e.g., regarding the
relative weighting of certain and uncertain outcomes; Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979).3 Later in this article, we discuss
2That common-ratio and reverse common-ratio choice patterns violate
EU theory in single-play decisions does not necessarily imply that they do
so in multiple-play decisions. To our knowledge, this question has not been
addressed previously. Our initial analyses (see the Supplement) indicate
that reverse common-ratio choice patterns can be consistent with EU theory
in multiple play for some utility functions in the power family (Wakker,
2008). However, in our limited explorations of decision problems from
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Keren andWagenaar (1987), Keren (1991),
and Barron and Erev (2003, Study 5), we found no cases in which standard
common-ratio choice patterns are consistent with EU theory in multiple
play.
3This definition does not properly capture common-ratio effects in prob-
lems with equal-EV options (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky’s, 1979, Problems
7 and 8) or common-ratio effects in the domain of losses, where risk prefer-
ences are often reversed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Keren & Wagenaar,
1987, Study 1), but it is sufficient for our purposes. Also, we note that
Kahneman and Tversky did not use the term possibility effect. Keren and
Wagenaar used the term for a common-ratio effect in which the scaled-
down problem involves very small probabilities, but we don’t know if they
were the first to do so. More recently, Kahneman (2011) used the term
to refer to the overweighting of low-probability events. In this article, we
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11, No. 4, July 2016 Persistence of common-ratio effects 363
how the certainty effect, for example, reflects the relative
frequencies of participants with the certainty choice pattern
(A and B′ in the above example) and participants with the
reverse certainty choice pattern (B and A′). Although these
patterns are discernable only in within-participants designs
in which participants respond to both the scaled-up and
scaled-down problems, they are assumed to be present but
unmeasured in between-participants designs (without this
assumption, it would be impossible to infer utility violations
from between-participants data).
In previous research, Keren and Wagenaar (1987, Study
1 and follow-up) showed that the certainty effect (or more
precisely, a near-certainty effect, as they used a probabil-
ity of .99 rather than 1.00 in their scaled-up problem) was
eliminated when the gambles would be played ten times
rather than just once. They obtained this result for both
gains and losses in their Study 1. In their Study 2, Keren
and Wagenaar showed that the possibility effect was elim-
inated when the gambles would be played 100 times in-
stead of once. Keren (1991) replicated Keren and Wage-
naar’s results for the certainty effect using two different sets
of problems and only five plays in the multiple-play condi-
tion. In all of these studies, the common-ratio effects dis-
appeared because the frequency of choosing the higher-EV
option in the scaled-up problem increased in multiple play,
whereas the frequency of choosing the higher-EV option in
the scaled-down problem stayed about the same or increased
only slightly. Li (2003) also reported that the frequency
of choosing the higher-EV option in a scaled-up certainty-
effect problem increased in multiple play, but that study did
not include a corresponding scaled-down problem. Finally,
Barron and Erev (2003, Study 5) reported that the certainty
effect was eliminated and nearly reversed when very small
gambles would be played 100 times.4 However, in contrast
to the other studies (and the effect of multiple plays more
generally), this result was due primarily to a large decrease
in the frequency of choosing the higher-EV option in the
scaled-down problem. Taken together, these studies provide
strong evidence that common-ratio effects are reduced or
eliminated in multiple play, though Barron and Erev’s re-
sults differ from the others in important ways. Table S.1 in
the Supplement lists the gambles used in these studies.
1.2 Theoretical explanations
There is no generally accepted explanation for why people
exhibit common-ratio effects in single-play choices. Expla-
nations as varied as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the transfer of atten-
follow Keren and Wagenaar’s usage.
4Barron and Erev’s (2003) article focused almost entirely on decisions
from experience rather than the more commonly studied decisions from de-
scription (for more on the distinction, see Hertwig, 2015; Hertwig & Erev,
2009). However, their Study 5 involved only decisions from description.
tion exchange model (Birnbaum, 2008), the priority heuris-
tic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 2006), Mukher-
jee’s (2010) dual-system model, decision field theory with
distraction (Bhatia, 2014), and EU models with noise or se-
quential sampling (Loomes, 2015) can account for at least
some common-ratio effects. However, even theories that can
explain common-ratio effects may fail to do so in specific
instances. For example, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992)
best-fitting parameter values for cumulative prospect theory
do not predict the possibility effect in Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1979) original example.5 A more serious challenge
is that none of these theories tested thus far can explain the
reverse common-ratio effects that occur for other pairs of
problems (Blavatskyy, 2010; Nebaut & Dubois, 2014).
Regarding the general effects of multiple plays, Wedell
(2011) noted that there are two basic types of explana-
tions: those that assume a common process in single and
multiple play and those that do not. In one example of
a common-process explanation, Langer and Weber (2001)
demonstrated that cumulative prospect theory can account
for participants’ choices regarding mixed, positive-EV gam-
bles in both single and multiple play when participants are
shown (and the theory is applied to) the aggregate distri-
bution of possible outcomes in the multiple-play condition.
This result is consistent with the fact that participants are
especially likely to accept multiple plays of (most) such
gambles when presented with the full distribution of pos-
sible outcomes (Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; DeKay, 2011;
DeKay & Kim, 2005; Klos, 2013; Langer & Weber, 2001;
Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992; for an exception, see Keren,
1991). The generality of common-process explanations is
limited, however, by the difficulty of envisioning or calcu-
lating the relevant features of outcome distributions when
they are not provided (Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; Klos, 2013;
Klos et al., 2005). This problem may be especially acute for
common-ratio effects because most of the choices involve
two risky options rather than one.
In our view, a more likely explanation for the effects of
multiple plays is that the decision processes are more thor-
ough and integrative in multiple play than in single play
(Wedell, 2011). For example, participants find EV informa-
tion to be more relevant (Montgomery & Adelbratt, 1982)
and report using more complex strategies (Wedell & Böck-
enholt, 1994) in multiple-play decisions. Evidence from
functional measurement (Joag et al., 1990) and eye track-
5In Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Problem 7 (the scaled-up prob-
lem in their possibility-effect example), 86% of participants chose a 90%
chance of 3000 Israeli pounds over a 45% chance of 6000. However, as-
suming Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) parameter values, the cumulative-
prospect-theory value for the former option (817) is less than that for
the latter option (835), as can be verified here: http://prospect-theory.
behaviouralfinance.net/cpt-calculator.php. As a result, the 1992 parame-
ter values imply consistent choices in the scaled-up and scaled-down prob-
lems, and hence no possibility effect. This prediction conflicts with the
1979 finding.
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ing (Su et al., 2013) also indicates that participants are
more likely to use multiplicative or weighting-and-adding
processes in multiple play than in single play. Most re-
cently, Wulff et al. (2015) reported that in a decisions-
from-experience task involving pairs of gambles, partici-
pants who anticipated making a multiple-play choice rather
than a single-play choice tried out the gambles more times
before deciding which one to play. Perhaps ironically, these
studies suggest that people are more likely to use compli-
cated decision strategies in multiple play, where such strate-
gies are more difficult to apply.
1.3 Seven new studies
In what follows, we report seven new studies regarding the
possible reduction or elimination of common-ratio effects
in multiple-play decisions. Our goal was not to resolve the
process issues raised above, though some of our data do bear
on the question of whether proper aggregation of long-run
payoffs is sufficient to eliminate common-ratio effects. Nor
was our goal to replicate or not replicate other researchers’
results, though that is how the project evolved. Instead,
our original intent was to assess whether the elimination of
common-ratio effects in multiple-play decisions— a finding
that we considered relatively well established — would be
moderated by participants’ views regarding the reasonable-
ness of aggregating outcomes over multiple plays (i.e., the
perceived fungibility of the outcomes; DeKay & Kim, 2005;
see the Supplement for details regarding our rationale). Al-
though we predicted that multiple plays would diminish
the certainty and possibility effects when outcome aggre-
gation is reasonable, both effects remained large and sig-
nificant in multiple-play decisions involving monetary gam-
bles for oneself. Surprised by these initial results, we con-
ducted several additional studies in which we attempted to
strengthen the multiple-play manipulation by (a) increasing
the number of plays, (b) improving the clarity and salience
of the relevant wording, (c) creating additional conditions
that were intended to encourage participants to think about
aggregate outcomes in multiple play, and (d) playing par-
ticipants’ choices for real money (in one study). Despite
these and other efforts (e.g., using both within- and between-
participants designs), certainty and possibility effects almost
always remained significant in multiple-play decisions.
For ease of exposition, we present our seven studies to-
gether rather than separately. We first describe our gen-
eral experimental approach, noting the most important dif-
ferences among our studies, and then use simple graphs to
compare our results to those of earlier authors. After illus-
trating our basic statistical model using data from a few ex-
ample studies, we present two small meta-analyses (separate
analyses for certainty and possibility effects) that integrate
the results of our new studies with those from previous re-
search. We then look in greater detail at the choice patterns
in our within-participants studies. Finally, we examine the
additional conditions that were designed to encourage par-
ticipants to think about aggregate outcomes and we assess
whether the effects of multiple plays are moderated by two
individual differences. Considering the old and new stud-
ies together, the overall results indicate that common-ratio
effects are much more persistent in multiple play than pre-
viously thought.
2 Method
Table 1 provides an overview of study characteristics, sam-
ple sizes, and participant demographics in our seven studies.
2.1 General procedures
In each study, we randomly assigned participants to the 1-
play, 10-play, and 100-play conditions. The first part of
Study 1 omitted the 100-play condition, whereas Studies 4–
7 omitted the 10-play condition (i.e., we increased the num-
ber of plays in the later studies). In our standard design, par-
ticipants in each condition made 11 choices between options
like those described in Table 2, with each problem shown on
a separate screen of the computer-based survey. For exam-
ple, Problem 10 was presented as follows in the single-play
[multiple-play] condition:
Option A:
45% chance [on each gamble] that you get $120
55% chance [on each gamble] that you get no money
Option B:
90% chance [on each gamble] that you get $50
10% chance [on each gamble] that you get no money6
Problems 2 and 8 (based on Keren, 1991) provided a
within-participants test of the certainty effect (as in Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979, and Barron & Erev, 2003) and
Problems 4 and 10 (based on Keren & Wagenaar, 1987)
provided a within-participants test of the possibility effect
(as in Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Treating problem as
a within-participants variable allowed us to assess partici-
pants’ choice patterns, as noted above (in contrast, the num-
ber of plays was always a between-participants variable).
Problem 6 provided an attention check in which one op-
tion dominated the other. Participants who did not chose the
dominant option in Problem 6 or who did not make all four
of the key choices (Problems 2, 4, 8, and 10) were excluded
6In the multiple-play version of Problem 2 (the scaled-down, no-
certainty problem) in Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5, the phrase “on each gamble”
appeared after the word “that” rather than before it. Although this unin-
tended wording could have changed participants’ interpretations and hence
their choices, there is no indication that it did. Choice proportions for this
problem were very similar to those in Studies 2, 6, and 7, which used the
intended wording (see Figure 1 in the Results section). All other problems
used the intended wording.
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Table 1: Study characteristics, sample sizes, and participant demographics
Study Location and participant
recruitment
Administration and
compensation
Manipulation of choice
problems
Multiple plays Payoff multiplier
for multiple plays
1 Carnegie Mellon electronic Online; $10 Within (and between) 10 and 100b 1
bboards, email lists, and fliers participantsa
2 Carnegie Mellon campus
sidewalk
On the sidewalk; candy bar Between participants 10 and 100 1
3 Ohio State psychology In lab; course credit Within participants 10 and 100 1
participant pool
4 Ohio State psychology In lab; course credit Within participants 100 1 and 0.01 (cents)
participant pool
5 Ohio State psychology In lab; course credit plus Within participants 100 0.01 (cents)
participant pool cash outcome of one option
6 Ohio State psychology In lab; course credit Within participants 100 1
participant pool
7 Amazon Mechanical Turk,
US only
Online; $0.50 Within (and between)
participantsa
100 1
Study Participants excluded Final N Student status Female Mean age (range)
1 9c 201 48% UG, 30% GS, 22% NS 50% 24 (18–58)
2 1d 490 87% UG, 6% GS, 7% NS 44% 24 (14–78)
3 27c 343 (165 in SC) UG 45% 20 (18–54)
4 43c 373 (144 in SC) UG 53% 19 (18–39)
5 14c + 1e 184 (91 in SC) UG 48% 20 (18–46)
6 19c + 73f 101 UG 62% 19 (18–26)
7 7d + 96f 699 —g 43% 34 (18–75)
Note. UG = undergraduates. GS = graduate students. NS = nonstudents. SC = standard conditions, with no additional questions or
statements designed to encourage the long-run perspective.
a Because problem order was reversed for half of the participants, the first half of the data can be treated as a between-participants study.
b Study 1 had two parts: Study 1a involved 1 or 10 plays, whereas Study 1b involved 1, 10, or 100 plays. Otherwise, the questions were
identical. See the Supplement for details.
c Excluded for failing the attention check and/or not answering a key choice question.
d Excluded for not answering a key choice question (there was no attention check).
e Excluded for suspecting that cash payments would not be made (they were).
f Excluded for failing the manipulation check.
g Not assessed.
from all analyses. The six odd-numbered problems were in-
cluded to reduce the likelihood that participants would no-
tice the relationships between the problems of interest; these
filler problems are not discussed further. In 5 of the 11 prob-
lems, the option presented first had the higher EV. Payoffs
were hypothetical in all studies except Study 5 (see below).
In the multiple-play conditions, participants were told
that each of the two options “involves a series of ten [one
hundred] monetary gambles.” After the options were de-
scribed, but before participants made their choice, they were
told, “Your choice between options A and B applies to all
ten [one hundred] gambles.” Before the very first choice,
participants were also told, “You may not choose option A
for some gambles and option B for others.” In Experiments
4–7, they were also told, “Regardless of your choice, the
outcome of any particular gamble in the sequence (say the
23rd gamble) has no effect on the outcome of any other gam-
ble in the sequence (say the 24th gamble or the 67th gam-
ble). Each gamble is independent of the others.” Study 7
included an additional analogy to “flipping a coin or rolling
a die over and over again.”
For each problem, participants made a preference rating
on a nine-point bipolar scale (omitted in Study 7) and then
a binary choice. Beginning with Study 3, these questions
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Table 2: Critical problems, gambles, and expected values (EVs) in the single-play condition
Higher-EV option Lower-EV option
Probability Amount Probability Amount
Problem and label of winning to win EV of winning to win EV
2 (No certainty) .20 $100 $20 .25 $60 $5
4 (Possible) .01 $120 $1.20 .02 $50 $1
6 (Attention check) .40 $80 $32 .30 $70 $21
8 (Certainty) .80 $100 $80 1.00 $60 $60
10 (Probable) .45 $120 $54 .90 $50 $45
Note. All options except the certain option in Problem 8 included a complemen-
tary outcome of “no money”. Labels and EVs were not shown to participants.
The six odd-numbered problems were fillers and are omitted here. Studies 2 and
7 used only Problems 2, 4, 8, and 10. Gambles in Studies 4–6 had lower stakes
(one tenth as large for these critical problems). Table S.2 in the Supplement lists
all problems used in the single-play condition of Studies 1–7.
stressed that the gamble would be played ONE, TEN, or
ONE HUNDRED times. In this article, we focus almost
exclusively on the binary choices, for consistency with pre-
vious research. In Study 7, we included the words ONE
AND ONLY ONE play and ONE HUNDRED plays in the
response options as well as the questions. In every study,
participants answered a few debriefing questions and pro-
vided demographic information at the end of the survey.
2.2 Primary differences among studies
Study 1 had two parts. Study 1a was designed to assess
the role of perceived fungibility in multiple-play decisions.
In this article, we consider only those conditions involving
monetary gambles for oneself (there were several other con-
ditions; see the Supplement) and ignore all questions related
to fungibility. In Study 1b, we simplified the design by us-
ing only monetary gambles for oneself, but added a 100-play
condition to strengthen the multiple-play manipulation. The
results of Studies 1a and 1b are combined for analysis.
The most obvious difference between our Study 1 and
Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987) studies is that we assessed
the certainty and possibility effects within participants (as
did Barron & Erev, 2003, for the certainty effect) rather than
between participants. In Study 2, we adopted a completely
between-participants design similar to that in Keren andWa-
genaar’s studies, with each participant making only one of
the four key choices (Problem 2, 4, 8, or 10) in either the
1-play, 10-play, or 100-play condition. In order to collect a
large sample relatively quickly, we administered the study
as a short paper-based survey on a busy university sidewalk.
After Study 2, we returned to our within-participants ap-
proach. In addition to the standard conditions (described
above), Studies 3–5 also included one or more conditions
designed to encourage participants to adopt a long-run per-
spective. These conditions might be expected to facilitate
the choice of the higher-EV option, thereby reducing the
certainty and possibility effects, especially in multiple play.
Additionally, because reasoning about gambles (and mul-
tiple plays of gambles) requires a degree of mathematical
ability or intuition, we hypothesized that the effects of mul-
tiple plays might be more pronounced for participants who
are better at math. In Studies 4–6, we examined the possi-
ble moderating effects of participants’ numeracy, defined as
“the ability to process basic probability and numerical con-
cepts” (Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, Merz, Mazzocco & Dick-
ert, 2006, p. 407; also see Peters, 2012), using an estab-
lished eight-item scale (Weller, Dieckmann, Tusler, Mertz
& Peters, 2013). We discuss these additional conditions and
measures later, after our main results.
In Study 5, we used real monetary payoffs rather than hy-
pothetical ones. To do so, we lowered the stakes in both
the 1-play and 100-play conditions (see Table S.2 in the
Supplement) and lowered the stakes in the 100-play con-
dition even further, by using cents rather than dollars. We
pretested these changes with hypothetical payoffs in Study
4, which had separate multiple-play conditions for dollars
and cents. Reducing payments in proportion to the number
of plays is a popular way to equate EVs and payoff ranges
(but not risks) in the single- and multiple-play conditions
(see, e.g., Keren & Wagenaar, 1987, Studies 1 and 2). Par-
ticipants in our Study 5 played their chosen option in one of
the 11 problems (selected at random) for real money before
leaving the session. The gamble in the chosen option was
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Figure 1: Percentages of participants choosing the higher-EV option in problems related to the certainty effect in previous
studies (top) and in the standard conditions of our studies (bottom). In Study 4, the results for 100 plays with cents appear
to the right of those for 100 plays with dollars. In Studies 6 and 7, solid lines show results for participants who answered the
manipulation-check question correctly; dotted lines (without error bars) show results for all participants. Error bars indicate
95% CIs.
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played either one time (for dollars) or 100 times (for cents),
depending on each participant’s condition.7
Although participants were reminded of the number of
plays many times (e.g., the number ONE HUNDRED ap-
peared 34 times in the standard multiple-play condition of
Studies 4 and 5), the results made us wonder whether some
participants had simply tuned out that information. Studies
6 and 7 included manipulation checks that asked participants
how many times their chosen option would be played in
each choice (Study 6) or in the choice they just made (Study
7). Our primary analyses are restricted to participants who
answered correctly (including all participants yielded very
similar results). Study 7 was our largest study, conducted
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. It differed from the other
studies in that participants answered either the two certainty-
effect problems or the two possibility-effect problems, with-
out any fillers. We had initially envisioned Study 7 as a
much stronger version of our between-participants Study 2,
but decided that there was no harm in adding a second prob-
lem. Because we manipulated problem order, the first half
of the data could still be treated as a between-participants
study (this was also true of Study 1, in which the order of
the 11 problems was reversed for half of the participants).
For additional details and the surveys themselves, see the
Supplement.
7Keren (1991) used a somewhat similar procedure, though payoffs in
the multiple-play (5-play) condition were not reduced and only one partic-
ipant from each group of 8 to 12 was paid.
3 Results
3.1 Visual comparisons between studies
Figure 1 presents results for the certainty effect, with pre-
vious studies in the top row and the standard conditions of
our studies in the bottom row. In each panel, a certainty
effect occurred whenever the higher-EV option was signifi-
cantly more likely to be chosen in the scaled-down problem,
which did not include a certain option, than in the scaled-up
problem, which did.
A few basic results are evident in the figure. First, cer-
tainty effects were obtained in the single-play conditions of
all of the studies, though they were generally larger in our
studies than in previous studies. Second, in the multiple-
play conditions, certainty effects remained relatively large
in most of our studies, whereas they essentially disappeared
in Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987) and Keren’s (1991) stud-
ies and were reversed in Barron and Erev’s (2003) study
(note the large drop for the scaled-down problem in Barron
and Erev’s data). Certainty effects were somewhat smaller
in multiple play than in single play in most of our studies
as well, though the larger spread in our studies makes the
magnitudes of these reductions difficult to assess visually.
Finally, it appears that there was not a reliable difference
between the results for 10 and 100 plays in our studies.
Figure 2 depicts remarkably similar results for the pos-
sibility effect. In each panel, a possibility effect oc-
curred whenever the higher-EV option was significantly
more likely to be chosen in the scaled-down problem than
in the scaled-up problem. In most of our studies, possibil-
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Figure 2: Percentages of participants choosing the higher-EV option in problems related to the possibility effect in a previous
study (top) and in the standard conditions of our studies (bottom). In Study 4, the results for 100 plays with cents appear to
the right of those for 100 plays with dollars. In Studies 6 and 7, solid lines show results for participants who answered the
manipulation-check question correctly; dotted lines (without error bars) show results for all participants. Error bars indicate
95% CIs.
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ity effects were large in both the single- and multiple-play
conditions, in contrast to the disappearance of the effect in
the multiple-play condition of Keren andWagenaar’s (1987)
study. Possibility effects were smaller in our between-
participants Study 2 than in our other studies, but the results
did not match those of Keren and Wagenaar’s study either.
As was the case for certainty effects, there was no consistent
difference between the results for 10 and 100 plays in our
studies. Overall, certainty and possibility effects appeared
more persistent in our studies than in previous studies.
In Studies 1–6, participants made a preference rating be-
fore choosing an option in each problem. Graphical re-
sults for mean preference ratings (see Figure S.1 in the
Supplement) were nearly identical to those for choice pro-
portions. Moreover, the choice-proportion results for Study
7, in which choices were not preceded by preference rat-
ings, were very similar to those for Studies 1–6 (see Figures
1 and 2), suggesting that the preference ratings had little if
any effect on participants’ subsequent choices. We do not
consider the preference ratings further.
Because we manipulated problem order in Studies 1 and
7, considering only the first half of the data yielded a
between-participants study in each case. Figure 3 indicates
that the results for the first half of the data look similar to
those for the full studies (see the corresponding panels in
Figures 1 and 2). The one exception was that, in Study 7, the
effect of multiple plays on the possibility effect was notably
stronger when only the first half of the data was considered.
However, in contrast to Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987, Study
2) results for the possibility effect (see Figure 2), about half
of the reduction in Study 7 was due to a decrease in the per-
centage of participants choosing the higher-EV option in the
scaled-down problem in multiple play (see Figure 3).
The apparent interactions in several panels of Figures 1–
3 are nonremovable in the sense that they cannot be elim-
inated by a monotonic transformation of the measurement
scale (Loftus, 1978; Wagenmakers, Krypotos, Criss & Iver-
son, 2013). The interactions in the older studies are nonre-
movable because they are crossover interactions: The lines
either cross or touch (Loftus, 1978; Wagenmakers et al.
used the term borderline nonremovable for cases in which
the lines merely touch, because the equivalence is based on
a statistical test). In most of our studies, the lines do not
cross or touch in Figures 1–3. Nonetheless, the interactions
are crossover interactions because the lines would cross or
touch if the data were plotted differently, with problem on
the horizontal axis and a separate line for each number of
plays. Crossing would occur whenever the two lines in a
panel of Figures 1–3 have opposite slopes, whereas touch-
ing would occur whenever one or both of the lines are es-
sentially flat. The only obvious exception is for the certainty
effect in Study 6 (see Figure 1), where both lines slope up.
There is no apparent interaction in that panel and any in-
teraction created as the result of a transformation would be
removable. Nonremovability is important because it implies
that the interactions are interpretable in terms of psycho-
logical processes (e.g., judgments of payoffs or risks) that
are monotonically related to the dependent variable. It also
means that the interactions reported in the following sec-
tions are not artifacts of the logistic transformation.
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Figure 3: Percentages of participants choosing the higher-EV option in problems related to the certainty effect (top) and the
possibility effect (bottom) in the first half of our Studies 1 and 7 (between-participants comparisons). Error bars indicate
95% CIs.
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3.2 Illustrative analyses
For each effect (certainty or possibility) in each study, we
used logistic regression to predict the choice of the higher-
EV option on the basis of problem (scaled-up problem =
–1/2, scaled-down problem = +1/2), plays (single play =
–1/2, multiple play = +1/2), and their interaction. The vari-
ables were coded so that a positive effect of problem would
indicate the expected certainty or possibility effect and a
positive coefficient for plays would indicate a greater like-
lihood of choosing the higher-EV option in multiple play.
A reduction in the magnitude of a certainty or possibility
effect in multiple play would be evidenced by a negative co-
efficient for the interaction. For brevity, we present detailed
results for only a few illustrative studies.
For Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987, Study 1) certainty-
effect data (see Figure 1), there was a significant positive
effect of problem, b = 0.71, 95% CI [0.39, 1.04], OR = 2.04,
χ
2(1) = 18.61, p < .001; a significant positive effect of plays,
b = 0.88, CI [0.55, 1.20], OR = 2.40, χ2(1) = 28.38, p < .001;
and a nearly significant negative interaction, b = –0.57, CI
[–1.23, 0.08], OR = 0.56, χ2(1) = 2.93, p = .087. These
statistics essentially recreate Keren and Wagenaar’s results,
but with the addition of coefficients and confidence inter-
vals. For Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987, Study 2) possibility-
effect data (see Figure 2), all three effects were significant:
b = 0.99, CI [0.45, 1.53], OR = 2.69, χ2(1) = 13.71, p <
.001 for problem; b = 1.69, CI [1.15, 2.23], OR = 5.41,
χ
2(1) = 42.69, p < .001 for plays; and b = –2.14, CI [–3.22,
–1.06], OR = 0.12, χ2(1) = 16.02, p < .001 for the interac-
tion. For both the certainty and possibility effects, the Prob-
lem× Plays interaction was attributable to the increased ap-
peal of the higher-EV option in the scaled-up problem in
multiple play.
In our Study 1, which had rather typical results for our
studies, we used repeated-measures logistic regressions be-
cause each participant responded to both the scaled-up and
scaled-down problems.8 For ease of comparison across
studies, we ignored the distinction between the 10- and 100-
play conditions in our primary models. For the certainty
effect (see Figure 1), there was a significant positive effect
of problem, b = 2.37, CI [1.85, 2.88], OR = 10.66, χ2(1) =
75.04, p < .001, but the effect of plays, b = 0.15, CI [–0.29,
0.60], OR = 1.17, χ2(1) = 0.46, p = .50, and the interaction,
b = –0.78, CI [–1.81, 0.24], OR = 0.46, χ2(1) = 2.29, p =
.13, were not significant. For the possibility effect in Study
1 (see Figure 2), there were significant positive effects of
problem, b = 2.58, CI [2.02, 3.14], OR = 13.23, χ2(1) =
79.68, p < .001, and plays, b = 0.56, CI [0.12, 0.99], OR
= 1.75, χ2(1) = 6.07, p = .013, but the interaction was not
significant, b = –0.90, CI [–2.01, 0.21], OR = 0.41, χ2(1) =
2.60, p = .11.9 In contrast to Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987)
8We used SAS PROC GENMOD regardless of whether problem was
varied between or within participants. When there was more than one ob-
servation per participant, GENMOD used generalized estimating equations
that yielded population-average estimates. Conceptually, these estimates
are more comparable to those from completely between-participants stud-
ies than are the average unit-specific (participant-specific) estimates from
random-effects models. Although population-average and unit-specific es-
timates typically differ for nonlinear models (Hu, Goldberg, Hedeker, Flay
& Pentz, 1998; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, pp. 303–304), random-effects
models fit using SAS PROC GLIMMIX yielded identical or nearly identi-
cal results in our studies.
9Results were similar when we used orthogonal contrast codes to dis-
tinguish the three levels of the plays variable. Specifically, the first code
compared the 1-play condition (coded –2/3) to the 10- and 100-play con-
ditions (coded +1/3), whereas the second code compared the 10- and 100-
play conditions (coded –1/2 and +1/2, respectively) while ignoring the 1-
play condition (coded 0). The first code yielded results much like those
in our primary analyses. For the second code, neither its main effect nor
its interaction with problem was significant in either analysis (for certainty
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results, the certainty and possibility effects remained signifi-
cant in multiple play (see below). In summary, the results of
our Study 1 did not replicate those of Keren and Wagenaar
(1987) especially well, though the signs of the coefficients
were the same in all of the above regressions.
3.3 Two small meta-analyses
In order to resolve apparently conflicting results like those
above, we conducted two small meta-analyses: one for the
certainty effect (11 studies) and one for the possibility ef-
fect (8 studies).10 For simplicity, we considered only the
standard conditions from our studies; conditions designed
to promote a long-run view are discussed later. In addition,
we considered all multiple-play conditions to be the same,
regardless of the number of plays (see footnote 9), and col-
lapsed across multiple-play conditions involving dollars and
cents in Study 4.
These analyses also compared effects from studies in
which certainty and possibility effects were assessed within
participants (most of our studies plus Barron & Erev’s,
2003, Study 5) or between participants (our Study 2 plus
Keren & Wagenaar’s, 1987, studies and Keren’s, 1991,
study).11 This approach is appropriate because the effect
sizes are in a common metric (a logistic regression coeffi-
cient, which is the natural log of an odds ratio) and the stan-
dard errors of the effect sizes correctly reflect the sample
sizes and experimental designs.12 An additional criterion is
or possibility effects), all ps ≥ .40. Similar results were obtained for the
second code in Studies 2 and 3 (the only other studies with both 10- and
100-play conditions), all ps≥ .072. Of the six possible interactions involv-
ing the second code in Studies 1–3, only three had the anticipated negative
sign (see Figures 1 and 2). Thus, the distinction between 10 and 100 plays
did not have a reliable effect on certainty and possibility effects in our stud-
ies.
10Greg Barron (personal communication, 2003) provided the data for
Barron and Erev’s (2003) Study 5 (see Table S.3 in the Supplement).
11Keren’s (1991) experimental design involved two parallel (i.e., sim-
ilar, but not identical) sets of gambles. For single play (n = 49), some
participants received the certainty problem (like our Problem 8) from one
set and the no-certainty problem (like our Problem 2) from the other set,
whereas others received the reverse. A similar procedure was used for mul-
tiple play (n = 47). Because different participants received the certainty
and no-certainty problems in each set, Keren treated problem as a between-
participants variable. We also analyzed Keren’s study in this way. How-
ever, because Keren collapsed across the two parallel sets of gambles, each
participant contributed two choices, doubling the sample size for the rele-
vant statistical tests (e.g., the number of observations in Keren’s Table 1 is
192, twice the true N of 96). To address this sample-size issue (but not the
related independence issue), we divided the counts in Keren’s Table 1 by
two. Because doing so yielded some noninteger counts, we conducted our
analysis twice, once with counts rounded up and once with counts rounded
down, and then averaged the results. This procedure increased the standard
errors of the logistic regression coefficients (relative to those for N = 192),
but otherwise had no effect on our substantive results. Though imperfect,
this solution is preferable to omitting the study from our meta-analysis.
12Rescaling the effect sizes to express them in a common metric, as sug-
gested by Morris and DeShon (2002) for standardized effect sizes aris-
ing from within- and between-participants studies, is not necessary in our
case because we use unstandardized regression coefficients from otherwise
that the effect sizes from the two designs estimate the same
treatment effect (Morris & DeShon, 2002). This require-
ment is plausibly satisfied in our case (see footnote 8), but
the effect sizes may differ among studies nonetheless (e.g.,
because of different instructions and monetary amounts).
We addressed these differences by treating study as a ran-
dom effect, to allow for unexplained variability.13
For both the certainty effect and the possibility effect, we
present results for three different (but not independent) ef-
fect sizes: (a) the simple effect of problem in the single-play
condition, which gives the magnitudes of the classic cer-
tainty and possibility effects, (b) the simple effect of prob-
lem in the multiple-play condition, and (c) the difference
between the these two, which gives the reductions in the
certainty and possibility effects in multiple play. The third
effect size is equal to the logistic regression coefficient for
the Problem × Plays interaction, but here we reverse the
sign so that a positive value denotes a reduction.14
Results for the certainty effect appear in Figure 4. The
left panel shows that the certainty effect in single play was
somewhat larger in our studies than in previous studies.
Across all studies, the overall effect size was b = 1.98, CI
[1.47, 2.50], OR = 7.26, t(10) = 8.61, p < .001, meaning
that the odds of choosing the higher-EV option were sub-
stantially greater when the choice was between two uncer-
tain options (as in Problem 2) than when one of the options
was certain (as in Problem 8). The results for multiple play,
shown in the center panel, are more striking. In all four
of the earlier studies, the certainty effect was eliminated in
multiple play, with Barron and Erev’s (2003) data showing a
nearly significant reversal. In contrast, six of our seven stud-
ies yielded a significant residual certainty effect. The overall
effect in multiple play remained sizeable and significant, b
= 1.08, CI [0.49, 1.67], OR = 2.95, t(10) = 4.08, p = .002.
The right panel indicates the reduction in the certainty ef-
fect in multiple play relative to single play. Despite the fact
that only 3 of the 11 studies found significant reductions, the
overall reduction was substantial and significant, b = 0.97,
CI [0.58, 1.36], OR = 2.64, t(10) = 5.51, p < .001. The re-
duction was similar when our Studies 1 and 7 were treated
as between-participants studies (i.e., when only the first half
of the data was considered), b = 0.88, CI [0.41, 1.36], OR =
2.41, t(10) = 4.13, p = .002, and when only our seven studies
identical models.
13In random-effects meta-analysis, the overall effect size is an estimate
of the mean of a distribution of population effect sizes rather than an es-
timate of a single population effect size (Shadish & Haddock, 2009). The
random-effects model reduces to the fixed-effect model when the between-
study variance is estimated to be zero. We report results from random-
effects meta-analyses, but fixed-effect meta-analyses yielded similar con-
clusions.
14For each study, the third effect size is equal to the difference between
the first two. However, this is not exactly true for the overall effect sizes,
presumably because the relative weighting of the studies (which is based on
the inverses of the variances of the studies’ effect sizes) differs somewhat
in the three analyses.
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Figure 4: Meta-analysis results for the certainty effect in single- and multiple-play decisions. Error bars indicate 95% CIs.
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Figure 5: Meta-analysis results for the possibility effect in single- and multiple-play decisions. Error bars indicate 95% CIs.
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were considered, b = 0.85, CI [0.36, 1.34], OR = 2.34, t(6)
= 4.25, p = .005.
Results for the possibility effect appear in Figure 5. In
single play (left panel), all eight studies yielded signifi-
cant effects, though the effect was barely significant in our
between-participants Study 2. The overall effect was b =
2.33, CI [1.71, 2.95], OR = 10.29, t(7) = 8.88, p < .001. In
multiple play (center panel), the possibility effect was com-
pletely absent in Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987) study, but
remained significant in six of our seven studies. The overall
effect was b = 1.34, CI [0.65, 2.02], OR = 3.81, t(7) = 4.62, p
= .002. Although the reduction in the possibility effect in the
multiple-play condition (right panel) was significant in only
two of the eight studies, the overall reduction was substan-
tial and significant, b = 1.07, CI [0.58, 1.54], OR = 2.91, t(7)
= 5.19, p = .001. Again, the reduction was similar when our
Studies 1 and 7 were treated as between-participants stud-
ies, b = 1.10, CI [0.42, 1.78], OR = 2.83, t(7) = 3.84, p =
.006, and when only our studies were considered, b = 0.95,
CI [0.46, 1.44], OR = 2.58, t(6) = 4.77, p = .003.
3.4 Unpacking the within-participants results
The above measures of certainty and possibility effects are
based on the difference between the (logit-transformed) per-
centages of participants choosing the higher-EV option in
two different problems. These measures are useful be-
cause they can be computed in both between- and within-
participants designs. Unfortunately, however, a reduction
in this measure of the certainty effect, for example, does
not necessarily imply an equivalent reduction in the per-
centage of participants displaying the certainty choice pat-
tern. To see why, one must consider the prevalence of
three of the four possible choice patterns to the scaled-down,
no-certainty problem (Problem 2) and the scaled-up, cer-
tainty problem (Problem 8): choosing both higher-EV op-
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Figure 6: Percentages of participants with each of the possible choice patterns in problems related to the certainty and
possibility effects in the standard conditions of our six within-participants studies. Error bars indicate 95% CIs, but these
ignore between-study variability.
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tions (HH%), choosing the higher-EV option in Problem 2
and the lower-EV option in Problem 8 (the certainty pat-
tern, C%), and choosing the lower-EV option in Problem 2
and the higher-EV option in Problem 8 (the reverse certainty
pattern, RC%). The fourth pattern, choosing both lower-EV
options, is not directly relevant. The percentage of partici-
pants choosing the higher-EV option in Problem 2 is HH%
+ C% and the percentage choosing the higher-EV option in
Problem 8 is HH% + RC%. The difference between these
two percentages (the basis for our measure of the certainty
effect in the preceding analyses) is thus C% – RC%. For
this difference-based measure, a certainty effect is observed
whenever there is a systematic imbalance between the two
choice patterns. More important, any decrease in this mea-
sure in multiple play could be due to a decrease in C%, an
increase in RC%, or a combination of changes (e.g., a larger
decrease for C% than for RC%). Analogous logic applies to
the possibility effect.
Within-participants designs are appealing in this context
precisely because they provide this level of detail. Figure 6
shows the percentages of participants with each of the four
possible choice patterns for problems related to the certainty
effect (Problems 2 and 8) and, separately, for problems re-
lated to the possibility effect (Problems 4 and 10) in the stan-
dard conditions of our six within-participants studies. For
simplicity, we have aggregated across the 10- and 100-play
conditions in Studies 1 and 3, across the dollars and cents
conditions in Study 4, and across studies (ns = 1027 and
1076 for the certainty and possibility effects, respectively).
(Tables S.4–S.14 in the Supplement provide counts and per-
centages for all choice patterns separately for all conditions
of all of our studies.)
The percentage of participants exhibiting the certainty
choice pattern in Problems 2 and 8 dropped from 56.3%
in single play to 48.1% in multiple play. Random-effects
meta-analyses revealed that this reduction was significant
for our data, overall b = 0.39, CI [0.06, 0.72], OR = 1.47,
t(5) = 3.00, p = .030, and when Barron and Erev’s (2003)
data were also included (total n = 1188), overall b = 0.49,
CI [0.16, 0.82], OR = 1.63, t(6) = 3.61, p = .011 (for Bar-
ron & Erev’s data alone, the drop from 33% in single play
to 10% in multiple play was significant, OR = 4.42, Fisher
exact p < .001).15 In contrast to Barron and Erev’s results,
the certainty pattern remained the modal choice pattern in
multiple-play decisions in five of our six within-participants
studies and was the majority pattern in Studies 1 and 3 (in
Study 5, the modal pattern in multiple play was choosing
the lower-EV option in both problems). In Problems 4 and
10, the percentage of participants exhibiting the possibility
choice pattern dropped from 61.1% to 47.0% in our studies,
overall b = 0.63, CI [0.29, 0.97], OR = 1.88, t(5) = 4.76,
p = .005. The possibility pattern remained the modal pat-
tern in multiple-play decisions in all six studies and was the
majority pattern in Studies 1, 3, and 5.
The prevalence of the reverse certainty pattern increased
from 4.6% in single play to 8.4% in multiple play (see the
left panel of Figure 6). This increase was nearly significant
in our data, overall b = 0.66, CI [–0.18, 1.50], OR = 1.93,
t(5) = 2.02, p = .099, and was significant when Barron and
Erev’s (2003) data were also included, overall b = 0.80, CI
[0.04, 1.57], OR = 2.24, t(6) = 2.58, p = .042 (for Barron
& Erev’s data alone, the increase was from 7% to 24%, OR
= 4.54, Fisher exact p =.003). For the reverse possibility
pattern, the increase from 4.0% to 7.1% in our data was not
15For consistency with our other meta-analyses, these reductions are
written as positive effects. Also, because these within-participants studies
had essentially identical designs, we used individual participant data rather
than aggregated data for these meta-analyses (Cooper & Patall, 2009).
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Figure 7: Percentages of participants choosing the higher-EV option in problems related to the certainty effect (top) and
the possibility effect (bottom) in the long-run-prompt conditions of our Studies 3–5. In the distributional-info condition of
Study 4, the results for 100 plays with cents appear to the right of those for 100 plays with dollars. Error bars indicate 95%
CIs.
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significant, overall b = 0.47, CI [–0.42, 1.36], OR = 1.60,
t(5) = 1.36, p = .23 (see the right panel of Figure 6).
Overall, the moderating effects of multiple plays were
less impressive for common-ratio choice patterns than for
common-ratio effects. For our studies, reductions in the
prevalence of the certainty and possibility choice patterns
(overall effect sizes of 0.39 and 0.63, respectively) were
smaller than the corresponding reductions in the certainty
and possibility effects (overall effect sizes of 0.82 and 0.99,
respectively, for the same six studies). This difference re-
flects the fact that the prevalence of the reverse choice pat-
terns increased in multiple play, though not significantly.16
3.5 Conditions designed to encourage a long-
run perspective
In addition to the standard conditions discussed above,
Studies 3–5 also included one or more conditions de-
signed to push participants toward adopting a long-run
view. In all, there were three long-run-prompt conditions,
which we label the more-on-average, expected-totals, and
distributional-info conditions (see the Supplement for de-
tails). As part of the more-on-average condition of Study
3, participants indicated whether they would make more
money on average with Option A or Option B before they
made a choice. Participants in the expected-totals condi-
tion of Study 4 estimated their expected total winnings over
100 plays of each option before they made a choice. In
16For percentages, the relationships between effects and choice patterns
are dictated by simple arithmetic. This is not true for the corresponding
effect sizes, however, presumably because of the logit transformation and
the vagaries of fitting random-effects models.
the distributional-info condition of Studies 4 and 5, partici-
pants were told the mean and 90% confidence intervals for
total winnings over 100 plays of each option before they
made a choice. For the more-on-average and expected-totals
conditions, we reasoned that pushing participants toward
more thorough and integrative processing, which has been
shown to occur naturally in other multiple-play decisions
(Joag et al., 1990; Su et al., 2013; Wedell & Böckenholt,
1994), might lead to greater reductions of common-ratio ef-
fects in multiple play. For the distributional-info condition,
we reasoned that providing participants with relevant but
difficult-to-estimate information about the outcome distribu-
tions might have an even stronger effect, analogous to that
observed for decisions about mixed, positive-EV gambles
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1999; DeKay & Kim, 2005; Klos, 2013;
Langer & Weber, 2001; Redelmeier & Tversky, 1992).
Figure 7 displays results for all three long-run-prompt
conditions. As expected, these conditions generally in-
creased the percentage of participants choosing the higher-
EV option and reduced the magnitudes of the certainty
and possibility effects (see the Supplement for analyses).
The important question for this article, however, is whether
the effect of multiple plays on the magnitude of the cer-
tainty and possibility effects was moderated by the long-run
prompts. Although one might expect that the effect of multi-
ple plays would be enhanced in the presence of the prompts
(or equivalently, that the effect of the prompts would be en-
hanced in multiple play, where the long-run view is gener-
ally considered more relevant; Camilleri & Newell, 2013;
Li, 2003; Montgomery & Adelbratt, 1982; Wulff et al.,
2015), this was not the case. In aggregate analyses that
controlled for study (n = 900), the three-way Condition ×
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Problem × Plays interaction was not significant for either
the certainty effect or the possibility effect, both ps ≥ .29.
Controlling for study, both the certainty effect and the possi-
bility effect remained significant in multiple-play decisions
in the long-run-prompt conditions, both ps < .001.
Separate analyses for the different studies and long-run-
prompt conditions yielded similar results, though there was
some variation. In particular, the possibility effect was elim-
inated in multiple-play decisions in the distributional-info
condition of Study 5, McNemar exact p = .39, but the cer-
tainty effect remained strong in multiple-play decisions in
the same condition of that study, p < .001 (see Figure 7). Cu-
riously, these results were nearly the opposite of those in the
standard condition of Study 5, where the certainty effect was
not quite significant in multiple play, p = .064, but the possi-
bility was, p < .001 (see Figures 1 and 2). Collapsing across
the standard and distributional-info conditions of Study 5,
both effects remained strong and significant in multiple-play
decisions, both ps < .001.
Notwithstanding this variation, it appears that requiring
participants to think about aggregate long-term outcomes
(as in the more-on-average and expected-totals conditions)
or telling them what those aggregate outcomes are likely to
be (as in the distributional-info condition) is not generally
sufficient for eliminating common-ratio effects in multiple-
play decisions.
3.6 Individual differences in insight and nu-
meracy
To assess the possible effects of more thorough and integra-
tive processing in a different way, we also tested whether
the effects of multiple plays were moderated by individual
differences in insight and numeracy (see the Supplement for
details). We defined high-insight participants as those who
correctly identified the better option in the relevant prob-
lems of Study 3’s more-on-average condition and those who
correctly ordered the expected payoffs of the options in the
relevant problems of Study 4’s expected-totals condition. As
anticipated, these high-insight participants were more likely
to choose higher-EV options, all ps ≤ .001. However, there
was no indication that high-insight participants showed sig-
nificantly smaller certainty and possibility effects or that the
effect of multiple plays on certainty and possibility effects
was reliably different for high- and low-insight participants,
all ps ≥ .14.
To investigate the possible effects of numeracy, we con-
ducted combined analyses of the standard conditions of
Studies 4–6, treating numeracy as a continuous measure and
controlling for study. For the certainty effect, there were no
significant effects of numeracy or its interactions, all ps ≥
.14. For the possibility effect, more numerate participants
were more likely to choose higher-EV options, p < .001.
Interestingly, more numerate participants exhibited larger
possibility effects than less numerate participants in single-
play decisions, p = .005, but not in multiple-play decisions,
p = .38, though the three-way interaction that distinguishes
these situations was not significant, p = .13. Finally, consid-
ering only those participants with above-average numeracy
scores (five or higher on the eight-item scale), the certainty
and possibility effects remained significant in multiple play,
again controlling for study, both ps < .001. In summary,
certainty and possibility effects in multiple-play decisions
appear to be largely unrelated to participants’ insight and
numeracy.
4 Discussion
Results from our primary meta-analyses indicated that, on
average, certainty and possibility effects in multiple-play
decisions were about 50–60% as large as those in single-
play decisions. In other words, the effects were reduced but
not eliminated (see Figures 4 and 5). With the exception of
Study 6, the certainty-effect reductions in our studies were
similar in magnitude to those in previous studies. However,
because the certainty effects in the single-play conditions
of our studies were larger than those in previous studies,
these reductions were insufficient to eliminate the effects.
For possibility effects, the reductions in our studies were no-
ticeably smaller than that reported by Keren and Wagenaar
(1987).
In our within-participants studies, reductions in the preva-
lence of the certainty and possibility choice patterns in mul-
tiple play were even smaller than the corresponding reduc-
tions in the certainty and possibility effects, because of the
(nonsignificant) rise in the prevalence of the reverse choice
patterns in multiple play (see Figure 6). Indeed, the certainty
and possibility choice patterns almost always remained the
modal or majority patterns in multiple-play decisions in our
within-participants studies.
In general, the effect of the number of plays on the magni-
tude of certainty and possibility effects was not significantly
moderated by (a) conditions designed to foster a long-run
perspective, (b) participants’ insight into the expected long-
run payoffs of the gambles in question, or (c) participants’
numeracy.
What is most surprising in our results — and what
sets our results apart from those of previous studies —
is how strongly participants clung to lower-EV options in
multiple-play decisions. For example, in Problem 8 of the
distributional-info condition of our incentivized Study 5, we
told participants that they could expect to win 600¢ total
with 100 plays of one option and about 800¢ total (with a
90% chance of winning between 730¢ and 860¢) with 100
plays of the other option. Despite this forceful push to-
ward the higher-EV option, 26 of the 45 participants in this
condition (58%) chose the lower-EV sure thing. Moreover,
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the percentage of participants exhibiting the certainty choice
pattern (44%) was only slightly less than that for single-play
decisions in the same information condition (48%).
It is possible that we could eliminate common-ratio ef-
fects in multiple-play decisions by using even stronger infor-
mation manipulations. For example, we could show partic-
ipants the complete distributions of possible aggregate out-
comes or we could tell participants the exact likelihood of
coming out ahead in the long run with one option or the
other (e.g., that there is a 99.9996% chance that the total
payoff from 100 plays of the risky option will exceed the to-
tal payoff from 100 plays of the certain option in our Prob-
lem 8). However, the potential benefit of such efforts is
unclear, especially when previous studies have eliminated
common-ratio effects without providing any additional in-
formation to participants.
4.1 Why the discrepancy in persistence?
The obvious question is why the certainty and possibility ef-
fects persisted in multiple-play decisions in our studies, but
not in previous studies. Differences between gambles is not
a plausible explanation, as we based our gambles on those
used by previous authors (Keren, 1991; Keren & Wagenaar,
1987, Study 2). Differences in motivation or ability between
our U.S. participants and previous authors’ Dutch and Is-
raeli participants also strike us as unlikely explanations. In-
dividual differences in insight and numeracy did not signifi-
cantly affect our primary results, nor did our attempts to pro-
mote participants’ long-run insight with various prompts. A
third, more general observation — that effect sizes tend to
be smaller in replications than in the initial research (Open
Science Collaboration, 2015) — applies to our results, but
only partially. Although the effect of multiple plays on the
possibility effect was smaller in our studies than in previous
work (see the right panel of Figure 5), this was not generally
the case for the certainty effect (see the right panel of Figure
4). Additionally, the certainty and possibility effects them-
selves remained larger in the multiple-play conditions of our
studies than in previous research (see the middle panels of
Figures 4 and 5).
Another potential reason for the discrepancy is that we
usually assessed certainty and possibility effects within par-
ticipants, whereas Keren and Wagenaar (1987) and Keren
(1991) assessed them between participants. For the cer-
tainty effect, this explanation is clearly contradicted by
the evidence. For example, the largest reduction and the
smallest certainty effect in multiple play (indeed, a nearly
significant reverse certainty effect) were reported by Bar-
ron and Erev (2003), who used a within-participants de-
sign. Keren’s (1991) design also had within-participants
features (see footnote 11). Additionally, the certainty
effect remained significant in multiple-play decisions in
our between-participants Study 2 (see Figure 1) and our
between-participants analyses of Studies 1 and 7 (see Fig-
ure 3), all Fisher exact ps ≤ .001. The verdict is less clear-
cut for the possibility effect. That effect was not signifi-
cant in multiple-play decisions in our between-participants
Study 2, Fisher exact p = .21 (see Figure 2), but it remained
significant in our between-participants analyses of Studies
1 and 7, p < .001 and p = .036, respectively (see Figure
3). Interestingly, the reduction of the possibility effect in
Studies 2 and 7 resulted from a smaller percentage of par-
ticipants choosing the higher-EV option in the scaled-down
problem rather than (or in addition to) a larger percentage
of participants choosing the higher-EV option in the scaled-
up problem. That is not the pattern of results observed by
Keren and Wagenaar (1987, Study 2). More formal analyses
using all studies indicated that the within- versus between-
participants distinction did not significantly moderate the
certainty effect or the possibility effect in multiple-play de-
cisions, both ps ≥ .21 (see the Supplement for details and
cautions).
4.2 A few thoughts about cognitive processes
Although the primary goal of our studies was not to distin-
guish between common-process and different-process ex-
planations for the moderating effects of multiple plays
(Wedell, 2011), some of our conditions and analyses were
guided by those explanations, at least in a general way. If
multiple-play decisions naturally lead some participants to
think about aggregate long-run outcomes, as previous re-
search suggests, then pushing participants in that direction
(as in our more-on-average and expected-totals conditions)
or telling them what those aggregate outcomes are likely
to be (as in our distributional-info condition) should have
led more participants to think in that manner, or to think
in that manner more clearly. In other words, if one views
“thinking about long-run outcomes” as a potential media-
tor of the effect of multiple plays on choosing higher-EV
options, then one can also view our long-run-prompt condi-
tions as attempts to manipulate that mediator. On the one
hand, these manipulations performed as expected: They in-
creased the popularity of higher-EV options and reduced the
sizes of the certainty and possibility effects, providing at
least some support for the role of outcome aggregation in the
reduction of common-ratio effects. On the other hand, these
changes were rather limited and were not significantly more
pronounced in multiple play than in single play (compare
the panels of Figure 7 to the corresponding panels of Figures
1 and 2). Apparently, directing participants to consider ag-
gregate outcomes is not enough to eliminate common-ratio
effects in multiple-play decisions.
Though not eliminated, common-ratio effects were re-
duced in multiple play, even in our standard conditions. Par-
ticipants were more likely to chose the riskier, higher-EV
option in multiple play than in single play when consid-
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ering scaled-up problems, but this was not generally true
for scaled-down problems (see Figures 1 and 2). These in-
teractions are interpretable in terms of psychological pro-
cesses, at least in principle (Loftus, 1978; Wagenmakers et
al., 2012). As noted in the introduction, however, there is lit-
tle agreement regarding the processes underlying common-
ratio effects or the effects of multiple plays. Even so, some
of our participants surely considered the implications of
multiple plays for the riskiness of the two options, the like-
lihood of coming out ahead with either of the two options,
or some other relevant comparison. For example, risk de-
creases as the number of plays increases, at least for one psy-
chologically relevant measure of risk (the coefficient of vari-
ation; Klos et al., 2005; Weber, Shafir & Blais, 2004). As
a result, participants may have been more likely to choose
the riskier, higher-EV option because it seemed less risky
in multiple play than in single play, even if they were not
less risk averse in multiple play. This shift toward choos-
ing the higher-EV option may have been larger in scaled-up
problems than in scaled-down problems because there was
more room for an increase in scaled-up problems (see Fig-
ures 1 and 2), because the risk reductions separated the op-
tions better in scaled-up problems (see the first section of
the Supplement for a related discussion), or for other rea-
sons. According to this logic, multiple plays might reduce
common-ratio effects not because participants behave more
rationally, but because the risk reductions associated with
multiple plays reduce the tension between risks and payoffs,
making the condition poorly suited to detecting common-
ratio response patterns (relative to single play).
Perhaps the most parsimonious explanation for the per-
sistence of common-ratio effects in our studies is that many
participants did not think seriously about the implications of
multiple plays, even when those implications were spelled
out. Instead, participants making multiple-play decisions
may have employed the same decision strategy (or a simi-
lar mix of decision strategies) as participants making single-
play decisions, without much regard for distributions of ag-
gregate outcomes. But why would participants not consider
the implications of multiple plays? One plausible answer
comes from Weber and Chapman (2005, Study 3), who re-
ported that the certainty version of the common-ratio ef-
fect was not significantly reduced when the outcomes of
the gambles in each choice would be delayed by 25 years,
even though the delay introduced a form of uncertainty. Ap-
parently, their participants treated the delay as a common
attribute that did not distinguish between the alternatives
and therefore ignored or edited out that information when
choosing between them. Many of our participants may have
treated the number of plays analogously, thus overgeneral-
izing a useful simplification strategy to a situation in which
it should not be applied. However, even if this overgen-
eralization is considered defensible in our standard condi-
tions, it is clearly not defensible when the implications of
multiple plays are made transparent, as they were in the
distributional-info condition of Studies 4 and 5. Moreover,
we have no good explanation for why participants would use
such a strategy in our studies but not in other researchers’
studies.
Finally, the frequency of reverse common-ratio choice
patterns was slightly higher in the multiple-play conditions
of our studies and was significantly higher in the multiple-
play condition of Barron and Erev’s (2003) study. One rela-
tively straightforward explanation for such increases is that
multiple-play decisions are more complicated than single-
play decisions, making it harder for some participants to
identify the higher-EV option. The resulting increase in
noise could partially offset the improved decision making
of other participants. Given their reliability in other studies
(Blavatskyy, 2010; Nebaut & Dubois, 2014) and their role
in the estimation of common-ratio effects, reverse common-
ratio choice patterns warrant further attention.
To recap, we speculate that participants may react to
multiple-play decisions in three general ways. First, they
may realize that having many plays helps differentiate the
two options and then determine or intuit that they would
be better off choosing the (not terribly risky) higher-EV op-
tion. Second, they may instead ignore the number of plays
because they think, incorrectly, that this common attribute
does not help differentiate the options. Such participants
would respond as if they were in single play. Third, they
may try to think through the implications of multiple plays
but be unable to do so. Participants in this group might give
up and respond as if they were in single play or they might
respond more randomly (or in ways that appear more ran-
dom) in the face of this increased uncertainty. If there are
enough participants in the first category, experimental re-
sults will look like those of Keren and Wagenaar (1987) and
Keren (1991); if there are more in the second and third cat-
egories, the results will look more like ours.
4.3 Putting the results in context
Although our finding that common-ratio effects are not
eliminated in multiple play is at odds with previous results
for these effects, it is consistent with the broader literature
on the distinction between single- and multiple-play deci-
sions. For example, when the distribution of possible ag-
gregate outcomes is not shown, the percentage of partic-
ipants opting to play mixed, positive-EV gambles usually
increases in multiple play, but the increases are far from
complete (e.g., from 43% to 63% in Redelmeier & Tversky,
1992) and are not always observed (e.g., Benartzi & Thaler,
1991, Study 1). Similarly, Liu and Colman (2009) reported
that the percentage of participants choosing an ambiguous,
higher-EV option over an unambiguous, lower-EV option
increased in multiple play, but 29% to 49% of participants
(depending on the study and choice) still sacrificed EV in
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order to avoid ambiguity. The description-experience gap is
also not eliminated in multiple-play decisions, though it is
reduced (Camilleri & Newell, 2013).
Wedell and Böckenholt (1990) reported that preference
reversals were eliminated in the 100-play condition of their
Study 2, though not the 10-play conditions of their two stud-
ies. Because of the design of those studies, there are strong
parallels with our within-participants studies. As in our
analyses of common-ratio effects, Wedell and Böckenholt’s
results were based on percentage differences that depended
on the relative frequencies of two different response patterns
(preference reversals in the typical, predicted direction17 and
preference reversals in the opposite direction), as those au-
thors noted. Analogous to our results, the frequency of
the predicted preference-reversal response pattern decreased
with multiple plays in both studies, but the frequency of the
opposite response pattern increased in both studies. In the
100-play condition of their second study, the predicted and
opposite preference reversals accounted for 24% and 16%
of response patterns, respectively. The authors’ conclusion
that “preference reversals . . . were effectively eliminated”
(p. 434) in that condition means only that the asymmetry
between those percentages (i.e., the 8-percentage-point dif-
ference) was not significantly different from zero, not that
the percentage for the predicted preference reversal (24%)
or the total percentage for both types of preference reversal
(40%) was close to zero. In other words, the preference-
reversal effect was eliminated, but the preference-reversal
response patterns were alive and well.
By extension, when common-ratio effects are not signifi-
cant in the multiple-play conditions of between-participants
studies like Keren and Wagenaar’s (1987), Keren’s (1991),
and our Study 2, this result tells us only that the asymme-
try between the (assumed but unmeasured) common-ratio
choice pattern and the reverse choice pattern is not signifi-
cant. It does not tell us very much about the prevalence of
the common-ratio choice pattern itself, though that preva-
lence is (by definition) at least as large as the prevalence
difference between the two choice patterns. This distinction
between effects and choice patterns is by no means novel,
but its importance for the interpretation of results remains
underappreciated. In our view, research on judgment and
decision making would benefit from greater attention to the
response patterns of individual participants and the variation
in such patterns across participants and conditions.
To summarize, the most common result in this literature
is that violations of EV and EU theories are reduced but
not eliminated in multiple-play decisions. Viewed against
this backdrop, the persistence of common-ratio effects in
17The typical preference-reversal response pattern was that participants
preferred the gamble with a higher probability of winning a smaller amount
(the P bet) when choosing between two gambles, but preferred the gamble
with a lower probability of winning a larger amount (the $ bet) when pricing
the gambles.
multiple-play decisions in our studies seems less surprising
than the comparisons to previous studies in Figures 1 and 2
suggest.
5 Conclusions
In terms of the number of participants, the seven new studies
reported in this article more than double the amount of data
on the effect of multiple plays on the certainty effect. For
the possibility effect, the increase in data is more than five-
fold. Considering all of the available evidence, both of these
common-ratio effects are reliably reduced when participants
consider playing the relevant gambles multiple times. Yet
despite these reductions, both effects remain significant and
reasonably large in multiple-play decisions, at least on aver-
age. The latter result suggests that the oft-cited beneficial ef-
fects of multiple plays on the rationality of decision makers’
choices may be weaker than previously realized. Although
multiple-play decisions are often different from — and ar-
guably better than— single-play decisions, well-established
biases are unlikely to disappear completely in multiple-play
decisions.
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